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Abstract 
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence about the widening divergence between the macroeconomic performances 
of core eurozone countries and peripheral economies. We note that, while core economies operate close to full 
employment, there are evident signs of secular stagnation, i.e. widespread long-term unemployment and reduced growth 
potential, in the periphery. In such a context, we stress that the unconventional monetary policy implemented by the 
European Central Bank since 2015 has proved largely ineffective to stimulate investment demand and economic recovery 
in the periphery. More than this, it may even deepen the existing gap between core and peripheral countries. We suggest 
that a reform of EU industrial policy, which put emphasis on the productive development of underdeveloped regions in 
the euro area, stands out as the best strategy against the eurozone core-periphery divide and for improving the 
functioning and effectiveness of EU macro policies.     
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2014, most eurozone countries witnessed a resurgence economic growth after a painful double-
dip recession. Despite this positive fact, in the periphery of the eurozone economic recovery appears 
too timid to absorb widespread unemployment, and to bring it down to pre-crisis levels from the 
current unbearable two-digit figures. It is based on this evidence that Paul De Grauwe claims 
that “nowhere in the developed world is the ‘secular stagnation’ hypothesis more visible than in the 
Eurozone” (De Grauwe, 2015). 
The concept of secular stagnation has been used in the economics literature at least for 80 years. 
The US economist Alvin Hansen first introduced the term in his speech to the American Economic 
Association in 1938 in order to analyse the causes of apparently dismal US growth prospects and 
persistently high unemployment in the aftermath of the 1937 economic downturn (Hansen, 1939). 
Through the 1950s and 1960s, this term was associated with the permanent slowdown of economic 
growth and capital accumulation that some economists, mainly from Keynesian and Marxist 
traditions, foresaw for mature capitalist economies due to their natural tendency towards increasing 
oligopolistic concentration and decreasing profit rates (Steindl, 1952; Sweezy, 1982). Whilst largely 
forgotten since the 1970s until the first decade of the new millennium, secular stagnation recently 
came back to the forefront of economic and political debate since Larry Summers (2014) rediscovered 
it to explain the dismal recovery in the US economy from the doldrums of the last financial crisis and 
the consequent recession.  
Since then, an even more vivid debate has unfolded about whether the troublesome eurozone is 
suffering secular stagnation (Jimeno et al., 2013). The debate has many fronts: some believe secular 
stagnation is a self-inflicted pathology caused by stagnation policies, namely tough austerity policy 
(Hein, 2016), others argue that the unconventional monetary policy measures implemented by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) since the beginning of 2015 stimulated recovery in the eurozone and 
potentially avoiding the threat of secular stagnation (Gambetti and Musso, 2017). In this policy paper, 
we aim to contribute to this debate. We will do so by first looking at the symptoms of secular 
stagnation in the eurozone. We will pay attention to two fundamental macroeconomic indicators as 
possible measures of secular stagnation: (1) the dynamics of the unemployment rate; (2) the 
evolution of potential GDP and its gap with respect to actual GDP. Second, through the analysis of 
these macroeconomic indicators, we will try to assess the effectiveness of the quantitative easing 
(QE) policy of the ECB in counteracting a potential process of secular stagnation in the eurozone. 
Finally, based on the analysis in these sections, we will develop some policy proposals meant to bring 
the eurozone back to a much more sustained development path out of a decade of dismal economic 
performance.  
Our analysis suggests that there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity among the eurozone 
member states, between some core economies and peripheral countries in particular. Whilst the core 
of the eurozone does not seem to show forewarning signs of secular stagnation, most peripheral 
countries have not fully recovered from the last financial and economic crisis. Persistently high rates 
of unemployment, and a significant and long-lasting slowdown in the trend growth of potential GDP 
are afflicting the state of the economy in some peripheral eurozone countries. By the same token, this 
evidence also suggests that the ECB QE, although strategic to ensuring the survival of the eurozone 
alongside the launch of the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) programme, has been rather 
ineffective to boost a quick economic recovery in peripheral countries. Indeed, in the presence of 
widening gaps between different regions of the European Monetary Union (EMU), the one-size-fits-all 
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nature of monetary policy makes it largely unsuitable to tackle the deepening dichotomy between the 
core and the periphery in the eurozone alone, especially without proper coordination with other 
policy instruments. Accordingly, we emphasise that the European institutions could induce a prompt 
recovery of the eurozone periphery only by adopting a much more favourable approach to 
expansionary fiscal policy targeting, in particular the finance of technological innovation and new 
industrial developments in the peripheral eurozone economies. 
 
 
2. SIGNS OF SECULAR STAGNATION IN THE EUROZONE 
There is not a unique and well-established definition of secular stagnation or a consensus about its 
causes. Alvin Hansen (1939) defined the “essence of secular stagnation [as] sick recoveries which die 
in their infancy and depressions which feed on themselves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable 
core of unemployment” (Hansen, 1939, p.4). In Hansen’s view, as recently rediscovered and re-
elaborated by Summers (2014), secular stagnation corresponds to the incapacity of the economic 
system to ensure full employment due the system’s structural weaknesses and the ensuing deficiency 
of aggregate demand. The slowdown of population growth, the worldwide saving glut due to rising 
income and wealth inequality, and the exhaustion of technological opportunities are responsible for a 
persistent lack of investment demand preventing the achievement of full employment.  
In contrast to Hansen, Gordon (2015) describes secular stagnation as a supply-side phenomenon 
associated with the slowdown in the growth rate of labour productivity. This slowdown is caused by 
declining technological innovation. According to Gordon’s perspective then, signs of secular 
stagnation may be detected through downturns in potential GDP (i.e. the highest level of gross 
domestic product achievable when the economy works at full employment and inflation is constant). 
This differs crucially from Hansen’s definition, as it views secular stagnation as a phenomenon that 
can occur irrespective of whether there is (or isn’t) widespread unemployment. At a more theoretical 
level, this is a similar understanding of secular stagnation adopted by the Marxist perspective during 
the 1950s and the 1960s, which identified stagnation as the slowdown in capital accumulation that 
arose due to the intrinsic contradictions of capitalist economies. 
Given these varying interpretations of the concept of secular stagnation, it is quite hard to detect 
the existence of secular stagnation in the eurozone by looking solely at a unique economic indicator. 
For this reason, we focus our attention on the analysis of two different macroeconomic variables. We 
first look at the evolution of the rate of unemployment in selected eurozone member states in order 
to check for the persistence of very high unemployment levels ten years after the outbreak of the 
2007-2008 financial crisis. It is quite simple to see how this analysis is consistent with the definition of 
secular stagnation originally provided by Alvin Hansen. We then look at the evolution of potential GDP 
in selected eurozone countries. In particular, we look at the occurrence of any negative structural 
change in the dynamics of potential GDP (i.e. a slowdown in its trend growth rate) as caused by the 
financial and sovereign debt crises, as well as the presence of an upward turn after the 
implementation of QE by the ECB. In our view, this latter analysis is in line with the supply-side 
interpretation of secular stagnation proposed by Gordon, even though more research should be 
devoted to the demand-side factors that may cause structural change in the evolution of potential 
GDP. 
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2.1 Unemployment in the eurozone 
Figure 1 below shows the evolution of the rate of unemployment in eleven eurozone countries from 
2000 to 2017. In Figure 1, we distinguish between core economies (blue lines), i.e. Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, large peripheral economies (dashed green lines), i.e. 
Italy and Spain, and small peripheral countries (continuous green lines), i.e. Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal. The time span of our analysis allows us to observe possible changes in the dynamics of the 
unemployment rate before and after the eruption of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Also, it allows us 
to have a prime facie impression of the effects ECB QE may have had on the real economy since 2015.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Rate of unemployment in selected eurozone countries, 2000 - 20017. 
Source: Eurostat.  
Notes: Years associated to the outbreak of the 2007-2008 financial crisis in grey colour. The yellow line 
associated to 2015 identifies the first year of implementation of ECB’s QE. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that the 2007-2008 financial crisis clearly entailed strong negative effects on 
unemployment in the eurozone as a whole. The unemployment rates have increased in all the 
eurozone countries under observation in the immediate aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
Nonetheless, a considerable difference stands out between the performance of eurozone core 
economies and peripheral ones. In core economies, the unemployment rate has remained at a single 
digit level. It is now decreasing and below (in some cases even far below) the euro-18 average (red 
line in Figure 1). Among the set of core eurozone countries, France is the only exception with an 
unemployment rate slightly above the euro-18 average.  
In the periphery of the eurozone, the unemployment rate soared, its value going into double-digits, 
after the 2007-2008 financial shock. With the exception of Ireland and Portugal, the rate of 
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unemployment in Greece and Spain is still far higher than the euro-18 average, while in Italy the rate 
is still much higher than pre-crisis levels. In the end, Figure 1 seems to suggest that initially timid but 
recently improving growth records characterizing most eurozone countries since 2014 have not 
contributed to absorb mass unemployment and to reduce it to socially acceptable levels. This is 
particularly true in the periphery of the eurozone. In Greece, Spain and Italy, recent economic 
recovery definitively qualifies as “jobless growth”. In the case of Spain, even though real GDP has 
grown higher than its pre-crisis level in 2017, the unemployment rate still remains nine percentage 
points higher than the corresponding figure in 2007. This is worringly consistent with Hansen’s 
definition of secular stagnation: a significant block of hard-nosed unemployment, which may last for 
long and which recent economic growth does not seem to be capable to undermine. 
 
2.2 Potential GDP and the output gap      
Following Gordon (2015), secular stagnation could be better understood as a permanent reduction in 
the growth potential of an economic system. Regardless of the supply-side (Gordon, 2015) or 
demand-side nature (Dutt and Ros, 2007) of the phenomenon causing such a reduction, secular 
stagnation could be detected by analysing the evolution of potential GDP. Figure 2 shows the 
dynamics of potential GDP for the six core eurozone countries outlined before. The dynamics of 
potential GDP and actual GDP are both portrayed using indices, with 2000 as the base year. Figure 3 
shows the evolution of the same variables for selected peripheral eurozone countries from 2000 to 
2017. Figure 4, finally, shows the evolution of the output gap (the difference between actual GDP and 
potential GDP as a share of potential GDP) in each country. 
Figure 2 clearly shows the contraction in economic activity that followed the outbreak of the 2007-
2008 crisis, as well as the slight recession (see, for instance, panels 2.c and 2.f related to Netherlands 
and Finland, respectively) or economic stagnation that affected core eurozone economies between 
2011 and 2013 at the peak of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Since 2014, economic growth 
reinvigorated, the dynamics of actual GDP (yellow lines in Figure 2) being more pronounced than that 
of potential GDP. As one can easily verify, since 2014, trends in actual GDP (yellow lines) are steeper 
than potential GDP (blue lines) in all the panes composing Figure 2.  
Even more important for the sake of our discussion, Figure 2 reveals that the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis and the sovereign debt crisis did not produce any permanent negative change in the dynamics 
of potential GDP in core economies. With the only exception of Finland (and to a lesser extent 
France), the slope of lines tracking the dynamics of potential GDP in Figure 2 is largely unaffected by 
the crisis. In the jargon of economic analysis, there is no apparent sign of structural change in the 
evolution of potential GDP in most core eurozone economies in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis. 
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Figure 2 - Potential and actual GDP (index number, 2000=100) in six core eurozone countries. 
Panel 2.a - Germany                                                        Panel 2.b – France  
    
Panel 2.c – Netherlands                                                   Panel 2.d – Belgium  
                              
Panel 2.e – Austria                                                            Panel 2.f – Finland  
     
Source: author’s computation on the basis of data from IMF world economic outlook (2017). 
 
 
Figure 3 portrays a rather different picture for the periphery of the eurozone. On top of the 
sharper and prolonged downturn in the evolution of actual GDP (in comparison to core economies), 
the dynamics of potential GDP has become considerably flatter in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis with respect to its pre-crisis trend in all peripheral eurozone countries apart from 
Ireland (see green lines in Figure 3). The dynamics of labour productivity underlying the evolution of 
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potential GDP was stagnating in Italy and Portugal even before the 2007-2008 financial shock. 
Nevertheless, post-crisis dynamics have turned out to be even more dismal - potential GDP being 
almost flat, if not slightly decreasing in the case of Italy. Greece experienced a dramatic reduction in 
potential GDP, on top of the collapse in actual economic activity. Abrupt contractions in potential 
output like those observed in Greece are more commonly associated with physical and human 
damage during wars rather than “normal” economic performance in peacetime. The cases of Spain 
and Ireland seem to be less dramatic. Nevertheless, the slowdown in the trend of potential output in 
Spain is astonishingly clear after 2007. In Ireland, by the end of 20131, concern is more about a 
relatively weak performance in actual economic activity with respect to its potential rather than a 
permanent slowdown in potential GDP. Despite these differences among peripheral eurozone 
countries, Figure 3 clearly reveals that the outbreak of the 2007-2008 financial crisis produced a 
severe structural change in the growth potential of all peripheral eurozone countries considered in 
this analysis.  
On the one hand, this fact suggests that the periphery of the eurozone seems to present evident 
signs of secular stagnation even if we use the theoretical perspective put forward by Gordon (2015). 
On the other hand, it also shows that secular stagnation may not only be caused by long-run trends in 
technological developments and innovation opportunities, but also by short-run shocks. Financial 
shocks, in particular, may give rise to “balance sheet recessions” (Koo, 2013), i.e. a protracted period 
of time in which the private business sector deleverages, financial institutions restrict access to credit 
and non-financial firms downscale investment projects. The consequent reduction in aggregate 
investment, which likely remains low and insensitive to whatever expansionary monetary policy may 
be implemented, in turn causes a state of deficient aggregate demand with tough implications for 
technological innovation, productivity dynamics, and growth potential (Dutt and Ros, 2007). First, 
when aggregate demand stagnates, a sizeable part of the labour force may remain unemployed for a 
long time and labour skills lost, with an ensuing negative effect on labour productivity. Second, 
technological spill-overs that usually arise in a climate of buoyant investment tend to disappear in a 
period of depressed entrepreneurial initiatives. Third, growth potential depends on the sectorial 
composition of the economy, and it likely benefits from an expansion of high-tech innovation-
intensive sectors. These sectors, however, are those that mostly need external finance and fast-
growing demand in order to make their innovation activities profitable. Temporary contractions in 
aggregate demand and credit availability may thus cause permanent reductions in the growth 
potential of an economy by leading to a restructuring of domestic productive structures away from 
high-tech innovation-based sectors. For all these reasons, it is of paramount importance that 
governments could take active counter-cyclical fiscal stances in order to avoid temporary drops in 
aggregate demand, which might however cause a permanent slowdown in the long-run growth 
trajectory of the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 In the case of Ireland, we limited our analysis to data from 2000 to 2013 given a statistical change in 
the computation of major macroeconomic variables introducing a relevant discontinuity in the Irish 
time series since 2014. 
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Figure 3 - Potential and actual GDP (index number, 2000=100) in five peripheral eurozone countries. 
Panel 3.a – Italy                                                                Panel 3.b – Spain  
    
Panel 3.c – Greece                                                           Panel 3.d - Portugal 
    
Panel 3.e - Ireland 
 
Source: author’s computation on the basis of data from IMF world economic outlook (2017). 
 
 
Figure 4 below complements the economic picture of post-crisis eurozone by depicting the 
evolution of the output gap in eleven eurozone countries from 2000 to 2017. The output gap is the 
difference between actual GDP and potential GDP (as a share of potential GDP). Once again, a 
remarkable divergence stands out between the core and the periphery of the eurozone. By the end of 
2017, all core economies, with the only exception of France, show output gaps close to zero or even 
positive. Germany and the Netherlands are operating above their potential, this fact being a sign of 
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possible increases in inflation rates2. On the contrary, output gaps are negative in all the peripheral 
eurozone countries considered in this study. Of course, by looking at Figure 4 one might argue that 
the output gaps in some peripheral countries are too small to be too concerned about them (in the 
case of Italy, Portugal and Spain, for instance). However this interpretation of Figure 4 is misleading 
and must be taken with some caveats. Indeed, relatively small output gaps in some peripheral 
countries are due to the significant slowdown, if not reduction, in the dynamics of potential GDP (as 
shown by Figure 3) rather than to buoyant economic activity. The fact that in most peripheral 
eurozone countries the output gap is still negative despite of a significant reduction in the long-run 
growth potential makes the economic scenario characterizing some peripheral eurozone countries 
even gloomier. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Output gap in selected eurozone countries, 2000-2017. 
 
Source: IMF world economic outlook (2017) 
 
 
3. SECULAR STAGNATION AND ECB’S UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY 
The European Union and eurozone Member States struggled to find a proper response to the 2007-
2008 financial shock and sovereign debt crisis. On the one hand, the implementation of an active 
fiscal policy at the national level was severely restricted by fiscal rules and austerity measures 
imposed by European institutions. On the other hand, fiscal austerity at the national level was not 
compensated by any action at the European level, since a European federal budget pursuing anti-
                                                 
2 According to Eurostat data, inflation rates in Austria and Belgium are above 2 percent (i.e. the ECB 
inflation target) 2017, while it is equal to 1,7 percent in Germany - 1,3 percentage points more than 
its 2016 level. 
11 
 
cyclical goals does not yet exist. On top of this, there was a considerable lack of coordination between 
national fiscal policies, since the contractionary effects of fiscal austerity in the periphery was not (at 
least partially) counterbalanced by more expansionary fiscal stances in those (core) economies having 
more budgetary leeway. In the end, macroeconomic management of the business cycle was left solely 
to monetary policy and to the actions of the ECB.     
Following the strategy previously adopted by the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, in 
January 2015 the ECB announced the launch of its own Quantitative Easing (QE) policy. This decision 
was meant to expand the asset purchase programs already implemented since 2014 to a much 
greater scale, and, in particular, to considerably increase the amount of public bonds bought by the 
ECB in secondary markets. 
The ECB’s QE effectively started two months later in March 2015. It was expected to last until 
September 2016. Nonetheless, precarious economics conditions and persistently low inflation 
expectations3 have forced the ECB to continuously postpone its end. The first round of ECB’s QE 
involved buying 60 billion Euros worth of bonds a month. In April 2016, this increased up to 80 billion 
Euros a month, before coming back down to 60 billion in April 2017. From the start of 2018, this has 
dropped down to 30 billion a month. Overall, since the start of the program, the ECB has injected 1.7 
trillion Euros in the eurozone economy through purchases of government bonds.    
QE is usually considered as an unconventional monetary policy tool adopted by central banks when 
conventional instruments, namely reductions in the target interest rate, are believed to be ineffective 
or because they have reached the lower zero bound. In its essence, QE takes place when central 
banks create and inject freshly created money into the economic system through direct unsterilized 
purchases of bonds, both corporate and government, on secondary financial markets for a prolonged 
period of time. There are four transmission channels through which QE could influence the economy4: 
(1) the expectation/signalling channel, (2) the portfolio-rebalancing channel, (3) the bank-lending 
channel, and (4) the exchange rate channel. Through the expectation/signalling channel and the 
portfolio-rebalancing channel, QE is meant to reduce yields on long-term securities, government 
bonds in particular, and make the interest rate curve flatter. This might take place due to financial 
operators anticipating central banks’ purchases of long-term assets in order to exploit the possibility 
for capital gains. On the other hand, QE may increase financial operators’ appetite for riskier long-
term assets by reducing the return of short-term Treasury bills. Increasing asset prices and lower 
interest rates may in turn affect the real side of the economies in three ways. First, lower long-term 
interest rates may imply lower external financing costs and increase business investment. Second, 
rising asset prices may give rise to a positive wealth effect stimulating consumption and investment 
expenditures. Third, credit institutions may be induced to extend credit more aggressively given more 
solid balance sheets. Similar to the last point, QE may reactivate economic activity through a bank-
lending channel by allowing banks to concede new loans more easily. Finally, the expansion of the 
                                                 
3 Consistently with its own mandate, the ECB’s governing council formally justified the adoption of QE 
by the attempt “to address the risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation” (ECB, 2015). 
Nonetheless, it is easy to see how the ECB’s attempt to bring back expected and effective inflation 
closer to the 2% target was also meant to reduce the real interest rate even further and possibly 
prompt a stronger recovery of the eurozone by boosting investment demand.   
4 See the report from the European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies (2016) for an 
institutional analysis of the transmission channels of ECB’s QE in the euro area. 
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quantity of money circulating in the economy may prompt a depreciation of the exchange rate, hence 
boosting exports and the overall economic activity. 
There are several studies that investigate the effects of QE on financial variables such as the asset 
composition of banks’ portfolios, the evolution of long-term interest rates and stock exchange 
indexes, and the dynamics of banks’ profitability (Hüttl and Pitchler, 2017; Demertziz and Wolff, 
2016). However, there are few analyses about the macroeconomic effectiveness of ECB’s QE in 
avoiding deflation, lifting inflation towards the ECB target and, more in general, in feeding faster and 
more solid economic growth in the eurozone. Previous analysis suggests there is a good deal of 
uncertainty about the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policies on economic activity (Bank 
of Spain, 2015). Indeed, it seems that positive effects of QE on GDP mainly concentrate in the short 
run, and strongly depend on the deepness of the recession and/or financial turmoil QE deals with. On 
top of this, such short-lived positive effects may be compensated by long-run costs such as mounting 
asset bubbles, heightened financial instability (in particular when exit strategies start to be discussed 
by central banks), and distorted investment decisions due to artificially low interest rates (Gern et al., 
2015)5. When it comes to the specific case of the eurozone, Gambetti and Musso (2017) claim that 
ECB’s QE has led to significantly positive effects on inflation in the medium run, as well as a positive 
although progressively weaker impact on overall eurozone GDP growth. This point of view however is 
not undisputed. Frank van Lerven (2016), for instance, casts serious doubts about the capability of QE 
to jumpstart economic growth in eurozone countries, in particular in troublesome peripheral 
economies, by prompting an expansion of bank lending to the wider economy and by raising 
productive investments. Accordingly, he proposes monetary financing, i.e. the direct injection of 
freshly printed money in the real economy through public investments, or central banks’ transfers to 
citizens’ deposits, as a more effective alternative to QE (van Lerven, 2015). On the other side of the 
spectrum, Gern et al. (2015) argue that the effectiveness of ECB’s QE in the eurozone is likely to be 
even lower than that observed in other countries, and its risks of moral-hazard and fiscal indiscipline 
even larger (as due to ECB’s purchases of national governments’ bonds). In a similar vein, Alcidi et al. 
(2017) claim that it is now time for the ECB to exit from QE and to increase interest rates since core 
inflation indicators are getting closer to ECB’s target and some (core) eurozone economies now 
operate close to full employment. 
For the sake of this analysis, here we address this issue by focusing our attention on three 
economic variables. First, we analyse whether QE-led expansion of the money base has effectively 
triggered an expansion of lending activity to the real economy. We do this by tracking the evolution of 
excess reserves held by the credit system as a ratio to the total money base. We also observe the 
evolution of the total amount of outstanding loans conceded to non-financial private economic 
agents. Secondly, we observe the dynamics of gross fixed capital formation in the countries at stake. 
Indeed, data about gross fixed capital formation provide a first preliminary indication of realised 
demand for new investments. 
Excess reserves are the amount of liquidity available to credit institutions that credit institutions 
hold idle on their deposit accounts at the ECB beyond regulatory requirements rather than mobilise 
                                                 
5 A recent study from the Directorate General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament (2017) 
downplays the risks of financial bubbles in the eurozone as due to inflated financial markets by ECB’s 
asset purchases. Yet, it maintains that ECB’s future exit strategy from QE should be clearly 
communicated to financial operators and implemented gradually in order to avoid any possible shock 
on the market for public bonds.    
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them through the economy via new loans or asset purchases. The ratio of excess reserves to the 
money base may thus reveal how much ECB’s QE has effectively led credit institutions to siphon ECB’s 
freshly created liquidity into the economic system. This is shown in Figure 5 below from 2008 to the 
end of 2017. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Excess reserves-money base ratio, overall eurozone, monthly data, 2008M1 - 2017M12. 
 
Source: Authors’ computation on the basis of data from ECB. 
 
 
Figure 5 clearly shows that, since the beginning of QE in the first quarter of 2015, credit institutions 
have constantly increased the ratio of reserves to the total amount of “high-power money” created 
by the ECB. By the end of 2017, almost 40 percent of ECB-created liquidity was kept idle on credit 
institutions’ deposit accounts at the ECB itself rather than being fruitfully utilised for the extension of 
new loans to the real economy. This is an astonishing amount. It goes without saying that this fact 
considerably diminishes the alleged capability of QE to stimulate the provision of loans to the real 
economy from the supply side by injecting new money into the economy. 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of loans extended to non-financial private actors for selected 
eurozone countries according to data available from the first quarter of 2008 until the end of 2017 
(index value with 2008Q1 as base). Once again, a clear discrepancy emerges between the core of the 
eurozone and the periphery. In the core of the eurozone, the stock of loans to non-financial non-
governmental institutions certainly increased throughout the sample period. QE may be behind these 
positive developments (for instance, in the case of Belgium, France and Germany). In the periphery of 
the eurozone, credit institutions have continued to go through a process of considerable deleveraging 
despite the implementation of QE. Accordingly, they reduced their assets and the stock of loans to the 
real economy stagnated (Italy) or decreased (Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland). From Figure 6, it 
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seems to be clear that the launch of QE did not manage to invert such a trend, so that credit creation 
at the benefit of non-financial non-governmental borrowers continues to suffer in the periphery of 
the eurozone. Indeed, our finding is consistent with Albertazzi et al. (2018), when, in their attempt to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the portfolio-rebalancing channel, they detect different responses to 
ECB’s QE in “less vulnerable” (read core economies) with respect to “more vulnerable” (read 
peripheral) countries. In less vulnerable eurozone economies, the QE portfolio-rebalancing channel 
stimulated an increase in lending to non-financial corporations, while the opposite happened in the 
case of more vulnerable economies. This is why, when it comes to bank lending, i.e. the volume of 
bank lending to the real economy, they find that “evidence of [positive QE-induced] effects [on bank 
lending] are limited to non-vulnerable countries” (Albertazzi et al., 2018, p.20).    
 
 
Figure 6 - Stock of loans conceded to non-financial non-governmental borrowers by credit institutions 
in selected eurozone countries, 2008Q1 - 2017Q4, index number (2008Q1=100). 
 
Source: Authors’ computation on the basis of data from ECB. 
Note: The yellow line associated to 2015Q1 identifies the first quarter of implementation of ECB’s QE. 
 
 
Figures 5 and 6 provide a snapshot of the supply side lending, i.e. the will or capability of credit 
institutions to provide credit to the real economy in order to finance investment (or consumption) 
expenditures and induce economic recovery. To gain insights about the demand side, we look at the 
realised demand for investment. In particular, Figure 7 shows the evolution of gross fixed capital 
formation as a share of GDP from 2000 to 2016 in eleven eurozone countries. It comes with no 
surprise that the economic scenario characterising core eurozone countries looks rather different 
from that characterising the periphery of the eurozone. In the core of the eurozone, after an initial 
contraction associated with the outbreak of the worldwide financial crisis, gross fixed capital 
formation slowly converged back to pre-crisis ratios, so that they appear as rather stable through 
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time. In the case of the eurozone periphery, the reduction in gross fixed capital formation has been 
much more pronounced, as partially caused by the collapse of the construction sector in Spain and 
Ireland. Gross fixed capital formation is now much lower than its pre-crisis level in all the five 
peripheral economies, and it is considerably lower than the same figure registered in the core of the 
euro area. The time periods of the data is too short to make a reliable assessment of the effect of 
ECB’s QE on the demand for investment, as the annual data for investment ends in 2016  - just one 
year after the launch of ECB’s QE. With this caveat in mind, we can surely affirm that the supposedly 
positive effects of ECB’s QE on invest demand has not yet materialised in the periphery of the 
eurozone. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Gross fixed capital formation (as a share of GDP), selected eurozone countries, 2000 - 2016. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Note: Years associated to the outbreak of the 2007-2008 financial crisis in grey colour. The yellow line 
associated to 2015 identifies the first year of implementation of ECB’s QE. 
 
 
4. POLICY ALTERNATIVES AGAINST SECULAR STAGNATION AND THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE 
CORE AND THE PERIPHERY IN THE EUROZONE  
Since March 2015, ECB’s QE may have certainly contributed to keeping the Eurozone intact. Under 
mounting financial turbulences, the combination of Mario Draghi’s famous “what ever it takes” 
statement, the subsequent (virtual) implementation of the OMT program, and finally ECB’s QE all 
helped to calm down financial turmoil and to stabilise the economic and financial environment of the 
eurozone. This fact notwithstanding, the evidence provided in section 3 casts some doubts about the 
capability of ECB’s QE to boost investment and economic growth, at least in the periphery of the 
eurozone. There are some good reasons to believe that even ultra expansionary unconventional 
monetary policies, if not coordinated with other policy measures, cannot be the optimal policy recipe 
16 
 
in order to revitalize fast, sustained and sustainable economic development in the eurozone. This is 
even more so given the widening discrepancies dividing some eurozone member states from others. 
The concept of secular stagnation, as introduced by Alvin Hansen and recently re-elaborated by 
Larry Summers, directly points to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy alone to lift investment and 
ensure full employment. According to their views, secular stagnation is characterised by the fact that 
investment demand is highly inelastic to the real interest rate. But more than this, the essence of 
secular stagnation lies in the persistent lack of investment demand regardless how low the real 
interest rate might be. In this sense, the existence of secular stagnation is revealed in the diagram 
putting together saving supply (S) and investment demand (I) – see Figure 8 below, by the (apparently 
unmovable) position of the investment demand schedule far to the left of the I-S plot, rather than by 
the rigid slope of the investment demand schedule as such (European Parliament, 2016). For 
monetary policy, it thereby becomes (almost) impossible to reach a deeply negative “equilibrium” real 
interest rate (if ever exists) that might ensure high investment (IFE) and full employment, even by 
stimulating a higher inflation rate when the nominal interest rate has already reached the zero lower 
bound. This is even more so if we consider that inflation dynamics appears as only loosely responsive 
to massive monetary expansions in times of depressed entrepreneurial animal spirits. In such a 
context, ECB’s QE likely turns out to be a rather useless policy tool to boost investment and economic 
activity, at least in the depressed periphery of the eurozone.  
 
 
Figure 8 - Saving supply (S), investment demand (I) and the "equilibrium" interest rate (r). 
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In the eurozone, the task of the ECB gets even more complex. Indeed, with stable inflation below 
but close to 2 percent - its primary goal - the ECB pays attention to the dynamics of average inflation 
for the euro area as a whole, regardless of widening “regional” differences and of individual country 
specificities. Even if we accept that ECB’s QE might positively affect economic activity in the periphery 
in the long run, the ECB itself would likely terminate QE before it could ever display such positive 
effects in the face of rising inflation. The ECB’s target is likely to be reached, even with a depressed 
periphery, given the expansionary effects of QE in the core of the Eurozone. 
     Last but not least, there is a subtle third reason why QE is likely to be ineffective in forestalling 
secular stagnation in the periphery of the eurozone. According to its plan, QE does inject money in all 
parts of the Eurozone in a rather proportional way. In fact, asset purchases take place in the various 
eurozone countries according to their contributions to ECB’s capital, which in turn reflect each 
country population and GDP shares with respect the aggregate European Union. This fact 
notwithstanding, fresh liquidity injected in the financial system of a given economy is by no means 
bounded to “remain there”, and to support credit expansion, in one way or the other, in the original 
“designated” economy. For example, Italian banks, which are credited new liquidity by selling eligible 
securities to the ECB according to the QE asset purchasing programme, may then use these resources 
to buy corporate bonds issued by German corporations or to extend loans in other eurozone 
countries rather than providing credit to Italian businesses. If so, QE’s original plan of stimulating 
economic growth in Italy by providing new resources to the Italian credit system in order to ultimately 
allow it to extend more credit to domestic households and firms becomes ineffective. More than this, 
ECB’s QE, if left alone and uncoordinated with other complementary policies, could even exacerbate 
diverging dynamics between the core and the periphery of the eurozone rather than taming them.  
Figure 9 below shows that the economic scenario described in the final point above is not pure 
conjecture, but it rather constitutes a good representation of what has been going on in the eurozone 
since the beginning of 2015. Figure 9 portrays the evolution of Target 2 balances for selected 
eurozone countries. Target 2 is the electronic system through which international payments and flow 
of resources among eurozone countries take place and are recorded. In particular, a single country 
imbalance in the Target 2 system mirrors imbalances in the current and/or financial account of its 
own balance of payments. A Target 2 deficit, for instance, may stand for a current account and/or 
financial account deficit. Vice versa, a surplus in the Target 2 emerges when a eurozone country is 
running a current account surplus versus other eurozone countries and/or it is receiving net positive 
financial inflows from eurozone counterparts (i.e., it is running a surplus in the financial account). 
From the introduction of the euro currency until the beginning of the financial crisis, Target 2 
accounts were broadly balanced for all eurozone countries. This was due to the fact that current 
account deficits (surpluses) in the periphery (core) of the eurozone were matched by corresponding 
financial account surpluses (deficits). In other words, core eurozone countries were recycling their net 
positive payments due to surpluses in the current account in order to finance current account deficits 
in the periphery6. 
This recycling system all came to end with the worldwide financial breakdown and the sovereign 
debt crisis. Sudden stops and capital reversals hit peripheral eurozone countries (Merler and Pisani-
                                                 
6 Micossi (2012) labelled such an integration pattern as the “unholy compromise” between core and 
peripheral eurozone countries. It was triggered off by the process of monetary integration itself, and 
regulated (in an unstable and unsustainable way) the reciprocal development of core and peripheral 
eurozone economies until the outbreak of the worldwide financial crisis.  
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Ferry, 2012). Financial markets disintegrated and capital moved back from the periphery to the core. 
Accordingly, financial account deficits now emerged alongside long-lasting current account deficits in 
the periphery of the eurozone, leading to widening Target 2 deficits. In the core of the eurozone, 
financial account surpluses went hand-in-hand with current account surpluses, as well as Target 2 
surpluses. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Target 2 balances for selected eurozone countries, 2001M1 - 2018M1. 
 
Source: ECB 
Note: The yellow line associated to 2015M3 identifies the first month of implementation of ECB’s QE. 
 
 
Deep core-periphery imbalances in the Target 2 system partially decreased from the second half of 
2012 onwards after the virtual implementation of the ECB’s OMT program. Indeed, financial 
operators took the OMT program as an implicit public guarantee against the risk of sovereign default. 
Accordingly, a resurgence of (net positive) capital inflows took place from the core to the periphery. A 
new and final reversal in such dynamics eventually started with the beginning of ECB’s QE (yellow line 
in Figure 9). As stressed above, only a limited part of fresh resources injected in peripheral economies 
via QE were eventually used to purchase domestic assets or to provide loans to domestic firms and 
households. On the contrary, a significant part of them took the form of capital flows “inflating” core 
economies. This is why, since 2015, core (periphery) surpluses (deficits) in the Target 2 system 
reached astonishingly positive (negative) values that were never recorded before. 
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4.1 Alternative policies  
There is an abundant and long-standing economic literature about the ineffectiveness of monetary 
policy as a stabilization tool when different regions of a monetary union are hit by asymmetric shocks 
(Mundell, 1961; Frankel and Rose, 1998). Our analysis shows that a common monetary policy is likely 
to be suboptimal even when different regions are hit by common shocks but then follow asymmetric 
dynamics.  
The ultra expansionary unconventional monetary policy launched by the ECB since March 2015 
certainly contributed to maintain tranquillity on financial markets, reducing financing costs for 
national governments and creating leeway for the implementation of more expansionary fiscal 
policies. Nevertheless, it may easily turn out to be useless (or even counterproductive) when it comes 
to the reduction of increasing (structural) economic gaps between different member states of the 
eurozone. In this sense, ECB’s monetary policy cannot address regional convergence and 
development. Alternative policy options are more appropriate to deal with secular stagnation in the 
periphery of the eurozone. In our view, such policy alternatives should be orchestrated around four 
key areas: industrial policy; regional orientation; pan-European value chains; and clustering. 
1. Industrial policy: Regional convergence can be achieved only by developing and strengthening the 
productive structures of peripheral eurozone countries. Innovation, sectorial diversification, and 
structural change towards new and more productive sectors are the three major processes at the 
basis of productive development. Very importantly, they do not unfold as spontaneous outcomes 
of market forces and market integration. Past and more recent international experiences show 
that successful productive development requires strong institutional and governmental support 
(Wade, 2010; Farla et al., 2015). For this reason, an active EU industrial policy characterized by a 
strong regional character represents the best policy option to tackle the short- and long-term 
aspects of secular stagnation in peripheral eurozone countries. The importance of industrial policy 
for social cohesion and economic prosperity is already recognized and well accepted by European 
institutions. The same applies to regional convergence and solidarity. And indeed, a combination of 
regional and industrial development goals already exists in EU policy, since EU regional policy 
traditionally entailed some typical aspects of industrial policy (say supporting employment creation 
and structural change in less developed EU regions). What we suggest here is a change in the 
priorities and in the focus of EU policies. The overall EU industrial policy should now present a 
strong regional flavour, i.e. it should primarily target productive (re-) development of the eurozone 
periphery. 
  
2. Regional orientation: In our view, the implementation of a “region-oriented” EU industrial policy 
implies that cohesion funds, structural funds, and EU resources for R&D and innovation should 
become integrated pillars of EU industrial policy itself. Two points are worth stressing in order to 
make a region-focused EU industrial policy effective. First, According to Farla et al. (2015), funds 
for regional goals represented about 0,38 percent of EU GDP under the 2007-2013 Seventh 
Framework Program. Given outstanding evidence of deepening divergences among eurozone 
countries, the European Commission (EC) should take the increase of funds for regional 
convergence as an absolute priority. Such increase in EU funds for regional-oriented industrial 
policy does not imply any radical reform of EU institutions and/or EU policy framing. It just 
amounts to recognizing that the last financial crisis triggered a discontinuity in the relative 
20 
 
dynamics of different eurozone regions, and that the EU should counterbalance these diverging 
tendencies by putting far more emphasis on the already established EU goal of regional 
convergence via EU industrial policy. Second, a region-oriented EU industrial policy should be 
modulated according to specific regional productive strengths and weaknesses. Indeed, Ireland is 
different from Italy and Spain, which, in turn, are different from Greece and Portugal. Accordingly, 
EU industrial policy in Ireland should target the development of domestic productive networks and 
domestic value creation, whilst maintaining Irish specialization in highly dynamic sectors on 
international markets (Botta, 2014). In the case of Italy and Spain, EU industrial policy should have 
a more vertical character and encourage the fast expansion of dynamic technology-intensive 
sectors in order to reshape country comparative advantages away from more traditional low-tech 
industries. In the case of Greece and Portugal, the major goal of EU industrial policy should be to 
favour the creation of new productive sectors, hence the diversification of strongly concentrated 
relatively underdeveloped productive and export structures. 
 
3. Pan-European value chains: The emphasis on regional industrial development in the periphery of 
the eurozone is not at odds with the adoption of a comprehensive Europe-wide perspective, which 
envisions the creation of an integrated European productive network. Indeed, productive 
development in the periphery can be achieved by increasing productive, technological and 
innovation linkages among eurozone countries (between core and peripheral eurozone countries, 
in particular) and across sectors. The development of a deep, tight and dense pan-European 
productive value chain is strategic for two reasons. First, productive integration might give rise to 
technological spill-overs and be source of innovation and technological development in peripheral 
eurozone countries. Second, productive integration between eurozone countries can contribute to 
synchronize business cycles among eurozone countries themselves. Un-synchronized business 
cycles are one of the main asymmetries that undermines the effectiveness of monetary policy. This 
might therefore facilitate the implementation in the future of expansionary monetary policies as a 
useful tool against similar shocks and more correlated dynamics in different euro countries. 
 
4. Clustering: Innovation and the diffusion of technological progress take place through the 
interactions between a variety of actors such as universities, research centres, and firms. 
Accordingly, EU industrial policy should prioritize the development of innovation and technology-
based clusters in peripheral countries. It could do so by undertaking two actions. First, EU funds to 
the periphery should aim at raising expenditures on higher education, scientific education above 
all; strengthening physical infrastructures (say labs) devoted to host research activities; financing 
international research programs held in peripheral countries; creating EU-funded public research 
centres of excellence. Thanks to these actions, peripheral countries might close (or at least reduce) 
the widening gap with respect to core economies in terms of the accumulation of high-skilled 
human capital (Botta, 2014). On top of this, peripheral economies may become more capable to 
absorb technological knowledge and create innovation. All these actions are all the more 
important, as knowledge accumulation and technological progress hardly take place autonomously 
in local underdeveloped productive systems. In underdeveloped regions, firms perceive university-
industry interactions, and spatial proximity to universities and research centres, as essential 
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sources of innovation and technological progress much more than in advanced regions (see D’Este, 
Guy and Iammarino, 2013). Second, the above actions on the supply-side of knowledge creation 
can become effective if appropriately matched with demand-side policies that aim at raising the 
demand for investments in innovative and technologically advanced sectors. In this regard, we 
think about region-specific preferential treatments (e.g. tax and subsidy incentives, easy credit, 
and the direct provision of external funds) to new and fast-growing innovative businesses 
clustering around universities and EU-funded research centres. There is no doubt that such region-
specific incentives may create distortions in European-wide markets. This fact notwithstanding, 
their introduction should be justified by acknowledging the existing productive and technological 
asymmetries between core and peripheral economies. On top of this, structural change and 
productive development in underdeveloped regions can effectively take place only if industrial 
policies identify and tackle demand-supply mismatches and coordination failures that could 
otherwise easily frustrate the efforts of supply-side measures or demand incentives taken alone. A 
well-designed EU industrial policy should simultaneously undertake complementary supply-side 
and demand-side actions.   
The implementation of a redesigned region-oriented EU industrial policy has serious implication as to 
the financing of EU industrial policy itself. Fiscal policy, both at the national and EU level, has to 
address this industrial policy target. Indeed, the existing EU-imposed constraints to public budgets 
straitjacket national governments’ capabilities to expand resources devoted to industrial and 
innovation development. This is why the financial endowment of EU institutions should be 
dramatically increased in order to allow them to take direct action and implement a strengthened and 
integrated cohesion-industrial-technology policy. More than this, vital financial support to productive 
development in peripheral eurozone countries should come from the European Investment Bank 
(EIB). The EIB was founded at the beginning of the European community with the purpose of 
supporting economic development in underdeveloped regions, and counteracting centripetal forces 
possibly unleashed by market integration. EIB’s actions mainly focused on the financing of 
infrastructural projects. Although important, the EIB’s traditional concern about infrastructure 
financing cannot fully remove economic bottlenecks and coordination failures that prevent 
productive upgrading to take place in the periphery of the eurozone. In our view, the EIB should be 
reformed in a full-fledged public development bank, with a major stake in the provision of direct 
financial support to new business activities and innovation processes at the basis of structural change 
in peripheral economies. In doing so, the role of the EIB should not be limited to the provision of 
public guarantees to private finance, protecting the latter from lender’s risks. Direct financial support 
from the EIB should also have a strong anti-cyclical character, i.e. expanding lending activity and 
increasing its share in co-financed projects during periods of economic and financial distress.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Since March 2015, the ECB’s QE has undoubtedly contributed to preserve stability in Eurozone 
financial markets and credit systems, and to alleviate the burden of fiscal adjustments on national 
governments. This fact notwithstanding, there are good reasons to believe that it has been rather 
ineffective to stimulate sustained and sustainable economic recovery in the periphery of the 
eurozone. Indeed, the stylized facts and empirical evidence presented in this paper suggest that a 
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widening gap is opening between the core of the eurozone, which is close to high employment and 
whose potential growth does not appear to have been affected by the last financial crisis, and the 
periphery, where secular stagnation emerges as a concrete concern. In this context, ECB’s QE could 
have paradoxically played a perverse role in aggravating these divergences, as new liquidity injected 
in peripheral economies has not been deployed for the development of domestic productive systems, 
but rather flowed into core economies. 
The existence of diverging dynamics between the core and the periphery of the eurozone makes 
regional cohesion and convergence the most relevant issue for EU institutions and policies to deal 
with in the near future. A one-size-fits-all nature of monetary policy is not the appropriate response 
to such “regional” development problems. On the contrary, the EU can successfully tackle the 
eurozone core-periphery divide through the implementation of a region-oriented industrial policy, 
whose primary aim should be to support the productive and technological development in 
underdeveloped peripheral regions. The reform of EU industrial policy, and its designation as central 
strategy for the achievement of Europe-wide structural convergence, should come together with the 
reform of the European Investment Bank. The reform of the EIB should aim at creating a full-fledged 
public development bank, which directly provides (anti-cyclical) finance to new innovative and 
technologically advanced entrepreneurial initiatives in relatively underdeveloped eurozone regions.      
 
REFERENCES 
Albertazzi, U., Becker, B., and Boucinha, M. (2018) – “Portfolio rebalancing and the transmission of 
large-scale asset programmes: Evidence from the euro area”, ECB Working Paper Series no.2125. 
Alcidi, C., Busse, M., and Gross, D. (2017) – “Time for the ECB to normalise its monetary policy? 
Insignts from the Taylor rule”,  CEPS commentary 8th June 2017. 
Bank of Spain (2015) – “The effects of the ECB’s monetary policies in the recent period”, Annual 
report of the Bank of Spain, freely available for download at: https://www.bde.es.    
Botta, A. (2014) – “Structural Asymmetries at the Roots of the Eurozone Crisis. What’s new for future 
EU industrial policy?”, PSL Quarterly Review, vol.67 (2), pp. 169 – 216. 
De Grauwe, P. (2015) – “Secular stagnation in the eurozone”. Available on Vox CEPR’s policy portal at: 
https://voxeu.org/article/secular-stagnation-eurozone.  
D’este, P., Guy F., and Iammarino, S. (2013) – “Shaping the formation of university-industry research 
collaborations: What type of proximity does really matter?”, Journal of Economic Geography, vol.13 
(4), pp. 537 – 558. 
Demertzis, M., and Wolff, G.B., (2016) – “What impact does the ECB’s quantitative easing policy have 
on bank profitability?”, Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue no.20/2016.   
Dutt, A.K., and Ros, J. (2007) – “Aggregate demand shocks and economic growth”, Structural Change 
and Economic Dynamics, vol.18 (1), pp. 75 – 99. 
European Central bank (2015) – “ECB announces expanded asset purchase program”, ECB press 
release. Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html.  
European Parliament (2016) – “Secular stagnation and the euro area”, European Parliamen Briefing 
February 2016. 
European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies (2016) – “Transmission channels of 
unconventional monetary policy in the euro area: Where do we stand? ”, Monetary Dialogue 
November 2016. 
23 
 
European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies (2017) – “Extending quantitative easing: 
additional risks for financial stability?”, Monetary Dialogue February 2017, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/595341/IPOL_IDA(2017)595341_EN.pdf   
Farla, K., Guadagno, F., and Verspagen, B. (2015) – “Industrial policy in the European Union”, pp. 346 
– 387. In: Felipe, J. (ed.) – “Development and modern industrial policy in practice: Issues and country 
experieces”, Celthenam (UK) and Northampton (USA): Edward Elgar. 
Frankel, J.A., and Rose, A.K. (1998) – “The endogeneity of the optimal currency area criteria”, The 
Economic Journal, vol.108 (449), pp. 1009 – 1025.   
Gambetti, L., and Musso, A. (2017) – “The macroeconomic impact of the ECB’s extended asset 
purchase programme (APP)”, ECB Working Paper series no.2075. 
Gern, K-J., Jannsen, N., Koths, S., and Wolters, M. (2015) – “Quantitative easing in the euro area: 
Transmission channels and risks”, Intereconomics vol.50 (4), pp. 206 – 212.  
Gordon, R.J. (2015) – “Secular stagnation: A supply-side view”, American Economic Review: Papers 
and proceedings, vol.105 (5), pp. 54 – 59. 
Hansen, A. (1939) – “Economics Progress and Declining Population Growth”, The American Economic 
Review, vol.29 (1), pp. 1 – 15. 
Hein, E. (2016) – “Secular stagnation or stagnation policies? Steindl after Summers”, PSL Quarterly 
Review, vol.69 (1), pp. 3 – 47. 
Hüttl, P., Pichler, D. (2017) – “An update: sovereign bond holdings in the euro area – the impact of 
quantitative easing”, Bruegel blog post, available at: http://bruegel.org/2017/10/an-update-
sovereign-bond-holdings-in-the-euro-area-the-impact-of-quantitative-easing/.      
Jimeno, J.F., Smets, F., and Yiangou, J. (2013) – “Secular stagnation: A view from the eurozone”, pp. 
153 – 164. In: Teulings, C., and Baldwin, R. (eds.) – Secular stagnation: Facts, causes, and cures, 
London: CEPR Press. 
Koo, R. (2013) – “Balance sheet recession as the ‘other half’ of macroeconomics, European Jounral of 
Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention”, vol.10 (2), pp. 136 – 157.  
Merler, S., and Pisani-Ferry, J. (2012) – “Sudden stops in the euro area”, Review of Economics and 
Institutions, vol.3 (3), pp. 113 – 136. 
Micossi, S. (2012) – “Unholy compromise in the eurozone and how to right it”, CEPS Policy Brief no. 
277. 
Mundell, R. (1961) – “A theory of optimal currency areas”, The American Economic Review, vol.51 (4), 
pp. 657 – 665. 
Steindl, J. (1952) – “Maturity and stagnation in American capitalism”. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Summers, L. (2014) – “U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the Zero Lower 
Bound”, Business Economics, vol.49 (2), pp. 65 – 73. 
Sweezy, P. (1982) – “Why stagnation?”, Monthly Review, vol.34 (June), pp. 4 – 10. 
van Lerven, F. (2015) – “Recovery in the eurozone. Using money creation to stimulate the real 
economy”, PositiveMoney paper, available for download at: https://positivemoney.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/Recovery-in-the-Eurozone-FINAL-WEB-READY-2015-12-11.pdf.  
van Lerven, F. (2016) – “Quantitative easing in the eurozone: One year assessment”, Intereconomics, 
vol.51 (2), pp. 237 – 242.  
Wade, R. (2010) – “After the Crisis: Industrial Policy and the Developmental State in Low-Income 
Countries”, Global Policy, vol.1 (2), pp. 150 – 161. 
